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LIFE INSURANCE; "I DEATH FROM POISON ; " ACCIDENTAL SELFThe case of Af'Glother v. Provident
POISONING OF INSURED.

MAutualAccident Co., 89 Fed. 685 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, October, x898), may prove of much importance in the law
of accident insurance and it is a striking illustration of the divergence that so often exists between the rulings of the Federal and
State courts.
The policy was against accident, but it expressly excepted death
"from poison." The insured drank poison, thinking it a harmless
medicine, and died from its effects.
The efforts made by the courts to relieve against the operation of
such exceptions as this may be observed in Biddle on Insurance,
Sec. 805, et seq., or in the authorities cited in the opinions in the
185
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present case.

Paidv. Ins. Co., Ir2 N. Y. 472 (1889), is the
leading case in the State courts and it has been followed in many
jurisdictions as establishing a distinction between "death from
poison" and IIdeath from taking poison" or ''death by gas" and'
or "inhaling"
The word "taking"
"death by inhaling gas."
is held to imply a conscious and intentional act; in the language
of the opinion in Paulv. Ins. Co., "If the exception is to cover
all cases where death is caused by the presence of gas, there would
be no reason for using the word 'inhale.' " Again, 'in a very
recent case, Fidelity anti Casualij Co. v. Waterman, 161 Ill. 635
(1896), the court speaks of "a voluntary or intelligent act, as distinguished from an involuntary and unconscious act."
The possibilities of this construction of accident policies are
illustrated in Menneiley v. Assurance Cort., 148 N. Y. 6oo (1896),
where it was held that a death from accidently inhaling gas while
sleeping is not a death "resulting from poison, or anything accidently or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed or inhaled."
Sanborn, Cir. J., comments on this very severely in the present case
and asks pertinently: "If gas is unintentionally and unconsciously
taken or inhaled, why is it not ' accidently' taken or inhaled? If it
is not, then why is it not ' otherwise' taken or inhaled? And how can
gas get into the system in any other way than by being ' accidently
The
or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed, or inhaled? ' "
construction given this clause, he declares, "appears to be cunning
and astute to evade, rather than quick to perceive and diligent to
apply, the meaning of the words it contains in their plain, ordinary
and popular sense, ".and the path followed by these decisions "is
so narrow, tortuous and indistinct that we should hesitate long to
follow it."
He had already shown that the rule "Noscitur a
sociis" was inapplicable. The exception in this policy covered
also death resulting from fits of vertigo and somnambulism ; it
could not be that this meant only cases where the deceased intentionally had the fits or purposely, voluntarily and consciously
walked in his sleep.
While these last considerations tend to distinguish this case from
Paulv. Ins. Co. and others of that class, the decision is based on
broader grounds:
"There is no just reason why parties or courts should be
ingenious or eager to add to, subtract from, or to search out curious
and hidden meanings in the plain terms of their compact. Contracts of insurance are not made by or for casuists or sophists, and
the obvious meaning of their plain terms to the business and professional men who make and use them must not be discarded for
some curious and hidden interpretation that is to be reached only
by a long train of acute and ingenious reasoning."
" Death by poison" is held to be an unambiguous phrase which
raises no question or doubt of its meaning; the insurer is therefore
exempt from liability for death attributable to poison.
From this conclusion Thayer, Cir. J., dissents. He invokes the
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doctrine of stare decisis and cites many cases from the courts of
New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois to show how well established
is the rule of Paul v. Ins. Co. To the attempted distinction between "death from poison" and "death by taking poison" he
attaches no weight; instead, he assimilates these exceptions in a
policy to an exception from liability should the insured "die by his
own hand." In such a case, he points out, the intelligence to
understand the moral character and the effect of the act of selfdestruction has been made the criterion: Ins. Co. v. Terry, i 5
Wall. 58o (1872). Finally, he relies upon the rule requiring a
policy to be construed most strongly against the insurer.
The importance of this case is manifest. Apparently it was of first
impression in a Circuit Court of Appeals ; no Federal authorities are
cited in either opinion except to support the construction put upon
"die by his own hand."
How wide a departure this decision
marks from the course of reasoning pursued in the cases following
Paul v. Ins. Co. may be seen, for instance, in Pikelt v. Ins. Co.,
144 Pa. 79 (189i), a case relied upon by Judge Thayer. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Pollock v. Accident Association,
102 Pa. 230 (1883), upon a state of facts substantially the same

as in the M' Glother case, had enforced a clause in a policy exempting the company from liability for death by the taking of poison.
Notwithstanding this, in Pickett v. Ins. Co., the court, after a reargument before the full Bench, adopted the rule of Paulv. Ins.
Co. (then recently decided) and permitted a recovery for a death
from asphyxiation by carbonic acid in a well. The policy read
"death from inhalation of gas." The distinction is drawn that
the poison in the Pollock case was voluntarily and intentionally
taken by the deceased, while here the gas worked a violent ,,'ath.
We may point out, however, that although the liquid was swallowed
intentionally its nature was unknown and it was not taken as a
.poison; the facts of the earlier case come, therefore, within the rule
of Paulv. Ins. Co. and the attempted distinction cannot readily be
understood.
It is true, as Judge Sanborn shows, that these authorities in
the State courts do not cover this precise point, but the distinction
between "death by poison" and "death from taking poison,"
upon which they proceed, is disregarded both in the opinion of the
court and in the dissenting opinion. The question at issue is
resolved solely into this: Is a death resulting from purely accidental poisoning covered by such exceptions or does the policy
refer only to cases where the insured's own volition contributed to
the poisoning? In other words, should the rule be like that in
cases of suicide ?
In effect the evidence of the parties' intention relied upon by the
State courts is excluded, and the underlying question of substantive
law is decided upon a principle broad enough to cover the cases
decided by the State courts in favor of the insured.
This same principle had already been applied in Richardson v.
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Travelers' Ins. Co., 46 Fed. 843 (Circuit Court, M. D. Illinois,
18gi), where Blodgett, J., held that asphyxiation in one's room
by escaping gas was covered by an exception of "death resulting
from inhaling gas;" i. e., the decision was similar to that in Pollock v. Accident Association. The plaintiff relied upon Paul v.
Ins. Co., but the court thought the reasoning of that case unsatisfactory and the terms of the policy too clear to require construction. Moreover, the argument that the exception related only to
poisoning which involved the insured's volition, was disapproved
because of the difficulty in procuring evidence to show accident or
suicidal intent.
On the other hand, the Circuit Courts have followed Paulv. Is.
Co. in several cases, such as Westmoretand v. PreferredAccident
Ins. CO., 75 Fed. 244 (i896), and Lowenstein v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 88 Fed. 474 (1898), where the word "inhaled"
or
"taken" was found in the policy. The latter case, in the Western:
District of Missouri, is particularly interesting since it had already
been decided, but was not yet reported, when the decision was rendered in M' Glother v. Accident Co. The opinion is by Philips,
D. J. He refers to Paul v. Ins. Co., and to Richardson v. Ins.
Co., and then comments on the recent case of Early v. Ins. Co.,
71 N.W. (Mich.) 5oo (1898). This decision he thinks "hardly
germane" to the facts before him, as the policy read "death by
poison "-a difference of language upon which the Michigan court
had dwelt to distinguish the case from Paul v. Ins. Co. Judge
Philips approves of this distinction and says, "" it was properly held
that ' death by poison' included any and every manner of poison,
whether intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously, taken."
That is to say, he would have decided A' Glother v. Ins. Co., as did Judge Sanborn, though on narrower
grounds.
Judge Philips then reviews the futile efforts in New York to have
the rule of Paulv. Ins. Co. reconsidered and cites cases following
it in other States. In one of the latter (Casualo Co. v. Waterman, 16x Illinois, 632, z896), he points out a very reasonable
ground suggested for following this rule; the Casualty Company
was the defendant in several of the later cases and after the question had been adjudicated in the courts of its own State, the company must be presumed to have had this construction in mind when
it continued to issue policies in this form. A similar result, Judge
Philips shows in conclusion; had been reached in Manufacturing
Co. v. Jones, 66 Fed. 124, construing a contract to subscribe for
stock, and by Judge Taft in Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan, 58 Fed. 956.
The learned judge's treatment of the phrase "or otherwise"
calls for notice. The language in the policy is: ". . . injuries,
fatal or otherwise, resulting from poison or anything accidentally
or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed, or inhaled."
"Or
otherwise," he holds, cannot qualify the act of inhaling, but is to
be read in connection with "accidental ;" "it means an injury of
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a kindred character, and would cover an intentional taking as well
as an accidental taking." Again, he says, if the purpose of adding
this-phrase was to escape the effect of the ruling in the Paul case,
"1it was a concealed purpose, not apparent to the ordinary mind,
and not at all calculated to carry to the insured even a suggestion
that it was intended to say by this policy that the company would
not answer for liability resulting from inhaling gas or other poisonous substances, whether taken voluntarily and consciously or
involuntarily and unconsciously." Yet we may well ask ourselves
whether the insertion of these additional words might not indicate
an intention to effect another result. "Accidentally" would, of
course, -be specified, for the policy was against accident and "or
otherwise," in ordinary English is simply "by other means." The
two would, therefore, include all possible means, the one which
would first suggest itself being mentioned to show expressly that it
was included. The Century Dictionary, quoted by Judge Philips,
says only that in law, "'or otherwise,' when used as a general
phrase following an enumeration of particulars, is commonly interpreted in a restricted sense as referring to such other matters as are
kindred to the classes before mentioned." But the parties had just
used "or otherwise" in another than this restricted sense, for they
spoke of "injuries, fatal or otherwise." Injuries are necessarily
fatal or non-fatal, i. e., they are in two classes mutually exclusive.
Why would not the more familiar sense of the phrase be quite as
proper in this place as the artificial one adopted by the court?
The Circuit Court of Appeals have not as yet passed upon
a policy reading "inhaled or taken" but as we have seen no
effect was given these words in M' Glo/her v. Provident Co.
The operations of accialent insurance companies are generally
wide-reaching and often it must happen, if this case be followed,
that the insurers can bring their more important claims before a
Federal court and escape a liability which would be inevitable in
the courts of the State where the policy-holders resided. Be this
as it may, it is a satisfaction to have the law expounded with such
lucidity and vigor as Judge Sanborn has displayed in his opinion
and to see the plain words of a business contract given their natural
meaning.
Erskine HazardDickson.
CREATION OF TRUST;

ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION.

A

woman had on deposit in a savings bank a considerable sum of
money. She expressed to the teller of the bank a desire to put the
deposit in the name of her two sisters and herself, her object being
to enable her sisters to obtain the deposit on her death without
probate proceedings. The teller informed her that if she did as she
proposed, the money could be drawn out by her sisters during her
life. She replied that she had confidence in them. Her request
was then granted, the names of the two sisters were added to the

NOTES.

account in the ledger of the bank, and also posted in the deposit
book. The depositor informed the sisters of what she had done,
stating her desire to provide for them on her death.. She subsequently drew out part of the deposit, -but deposited other sums so.
that the total amount of the deposit at the time of her death was
more than at the time the account was in the three names. The
executor under her will and the two sisters claimed the deposit.
The court upheld the right of the sisters, on the ground that while
the transaction did not amount to a gift intervivos or mortis causa,
it did amount to a creation of trust by the depositor in tbe bank,and the acceptance of the trust by the bank: Booth v. Oakland
Bank, 54 Pac. 320.
For this theory of the result of the transaction there is some
authority. Schouler, in his work on Personal Property, Vol. II,
Sec. 78, regards a deposit of money in another's name as a declaration of trust, while in this case the court can point to several
authorities sustaining such a proposition, as, Bosdel v. Locke, 52
N. H. 238 (1872) : nstitution v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 12.2 (1895) ;
Martin v. Flunk, 75 N. Y. 134 (1878) ; MAfabie v. Bailey, 95
N. Y. 206 (1884); Cunningham v. Daven2port, 147 N. Y. 43
(1898) ; Gerrish v. Institution, 128 Mass. 159 (188o). Where,
however, is the declaration of trust? Deposit money in a bank.
The bank is a debtor to the amount of the deposit, not a trustee of
the money. The mere agreement of the bank to pay this money to
some one else does not make the bank any more or less a debtor for
the sum than it was before the agreement was made. Neither the
original depositor nor the persons to whom he or she has directed
the money to be paid could, on the failure of the bank, claim
priority for the deposit as a trust fund as against the general
creditors. The bank, therefore, in such cases, never becomes a
trustee. Neither, in the particular case under discussion, did the
depositor declare herself a trustee for the bank's obligation to her
in favor of her sisters. She intended to make a gift of some kind,
the sisters being volunteers. If the intended gift was not completely executed, it is now an elementary principle that the courts
will not give effect to the incompleted gift by holding the donor or
her representative trustee for the volunteer.
If we cannot support the decision on the theory advanced by the
Supreme Court of California, can it be supported on any other
theory? It is clear that the transaction amounted to a gift inter
vivos or it did not amount-to anything. If one makes a deposit in
a bank in the name of another, though that other may not know of
the deposit, the title to the bank's obligation is in the volunteer:
Howard v. Windrim Bank, 40 Vt. 597 (1868).
At least this is
the general rule in this country. There would seem to be no objection to regarding the assignment of the obligation of the bank to
a depositor as complete whether the depositor directs the bank to
place the deposit in the name of a third person and the bank does
as directed. If this last is correct, the only difficulty in the case in
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California is that the intention of the women was to retain full
power over the deposit. Her first intention was not to give her
sisters any interest till her death. When told that the method proposed by her would result in giving her sisters power over the
deposit during her life, she acquiesced. The fact that the reason
for this acquiescence was her confidence that her sisters would not
exercise the right during her life does not seem to be material.
She consciously attempted to create a joint ownership during life,
with a condition that should she die before her sisters, her rights
should pass to them and the whole property be then vested in them
absolutely. Such a settlement of personal property is perfectly
legal, and while we do not know of a case where one has conveyed
a joint right of property with himself to another, with a right of
survivorship in that other, without the intervention in the conveyance of a trustee to whom the property is first conveyed, we know
of no reason why it should not be done.
DiVORCE; CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT.
In the case of
Walton v. Walton, in the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 77 N. W.
392, (Dec. 8, 1898), an action by the wife for divorce, it was alleged that the husband had used vile and opprobrious epithets
toward her; that he had called her a bad woman, and accused her
of committing adultery. The court held that a false charge ot
adultery made by a husband against. his wife, and calling her vile
and opprobious names, was sufficient to constitute extreme cruelty
according to the statute.
While it is admitted that the tendency has been, especially of
late years, to extend the doctrine of cruelty as ground for divorce,
both in this country and in England, by the weight of authority,
the abuse and inhuman treatment must be such as renders cohabitation unsafe, or is likely to be attended with injury to the person
or the health of the party. The test must be danger of life, limb
or health. In Evens v. Evens, I Hagg Const. 35 (1790), it was
said: " Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness
of language, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not
In Rusthreaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty."
sell v. Russell, [1897] A. C. 395, a wife had charged her
husband with committing an unnatural crime, and insisted in the
charge publicly, after admitting that she had not an honest belief
in the charge. The court held that such ill-treatment was no
ground for divorce, saying there must be personal ill-treatment,
such as blows or bodily injury of any kind, or threats of such description as would reasonably excite, in a mind of ordinary firmness, a fear of personal violence. Words, however abusive, offensive, harsh, obscene or vulgar, will not amount to extreme cruelty
unless they be accompanied by some act indicating personal injury
to life or health of the party. This principle is established by
many cases. In Cheatham v. Cheatham, io Mo. 296 (1848),
charges of infidelity do not constitute such cruelty as to entitle a
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person to divorce. In Shaw v. Shaw, 17 Conn. 189 (845),
the
husband had charged the wife with adultery and used vulgar, obscene and harsh language, which would wound the .feelings. It
was held that these, unaccompanied -with any act indicating per- sonal violence, will not constitute extreme cruelty. To the same
effect was Detrick's Apeal, 117 Pa. 452 (1888), where the court
said: "There must have been actual personal violence, or reasonable apprehension of it, or such a course of treatment as endangered her life or health and rendered cohabitation unsafe.". In Blair
v. Blair, 76 N.W. (Iowa) 700 (1898), the husband had charged
the wife with adultery, but the court held that this treatment was
not such as to endanger life, hence not sufficient cruelty as would
entitle the wife to divorce. But any ill-treatment, or the use of
such language as produces mental suffering of sufficient degree as to
injure the health, will be sufficient cruelty. •In Jefferson v. Jefferson, 168 Mass. 456 (1897), the husband used vile and vulgar language to his wife when she was pregnait, and this was considered
such extreme cruelty as to be injurious to health- and sufficient
ground for divorce.
The thought that pervades all the decisions is not to lay down
any hard and fast rule as to legal cruelty, but to give protection to
the complainant against actual or apprehended violence, physical
ill-treatment or injury to health.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES; RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR BURIAL ExPENSES WHERE DEATH RESULTS FROM WRONGFUL ACT. Trow V.
Thomas, 41 At. 652 (July 18, 1898). In this case the Supreme
Court of Vermont decided that a parent could not recover expenses
incurred in burying a minor child who had been killed through the
The decision was based solely on the
defendant's negligence.
authority of a previous case, Sherman v. Johnson, 58 Vt. 40, 2 At.
707 (1886), but the court questioned the truth of the principle of
law therein enunciated. In Sherman v. Johnson it was decided that
where a minor son had been killed by the wrongful act of the
defendant, the child's father could not recover damages for the loss
of his services from the time of his death to his majority. In
reaching this conclusion the court relied exclusively on the common
law rule " Actio personalis moHlur cum persona'! and overlooked
the Acts of Assembly, 1847, No. 2 and 1849, No. 8, Revised Laws
of Vermont, 2134, 2135 and 2138, 2139. The cases of NMeedham,
Adm'nx v. Grand Trunk R. R., 38 Vt. 294 (x865), and Legg,
Adhm'nx v. Britton, 64 Vt. 652 (I89o), interpreting these statutes.
to have abrogated the common law doctrine of non-survival of
actions, and creating rights similar to those given by Lord Campbell's Act (1846), 9 and io Victoria, c. 93, also seemed to have
escaped the notice of the court.
Before the case of Trow v. Thumas, the right to recover damages
for burial expenses where death resulted from another's negligence

NOTES.

had never arisen in the courts of Vermont and it is fair to presume
from the language of the opinion, that had the court hot felt bound
to follow the decision of Sherman v. Johnson, which was stated to be
analagous to the question under consideration, a recovery for such
expenses might have been allowed.
At common law the death of a human being afforded no ground
for an action of damages, although where death was not instantaneous, the executor or administrator of the deceased might recover
for the pain and suffering experienced and such expenses as nursing
and medical attendance incurred prior to death: Finlaiv v. Chairnay, 20 Q. B. Div. 494, 502 (1888) ; Osborn v. Gillett, L. R.
8 Ex. 88 (1873). To remedy this hardship Lord Campbell's Act
was passed, providing that in addition to the common law right in
favor of the executor or administrator there might be a recovery for
such damages as were occasioned to the members of the decedent's
family by reason of the deprivation of his services. Only such
damages can be recovered, however, as occur on account of the
decedent not being alive to support his family, and, therefore, it
has been uniformly held that.damages which are purely incidental
to death, such as mental pain and anguish, loss of society and
affection are not recoverable: Blake v. AfidlandRy. Co., 18 A. B.
93 (1852); .Pym v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 4 B. & S. 396
(x863) ; Read v. Great Eastern Rr. Co., L. R. 3 Q3 B. 555
(x868) ; Row/y v. London .R.R. Co., L. R. 8 Ex- 221 (1873).
Nor can funeral expenses be recovered, for they are not incurred
qua the- decedent's family is deprived of his support: .Dalton
v. S. E. R. R. Co., 4 C. B. N. S. 296 (1858); Boulter v.
Webster, 73 Weekly Reporter, 289 (1865).
Lord Campbell's Act, being abrogative of the common law, has
received a strict interpretation from the English courts and only
such damages can be recovered in an action where death results
from another's wrongful act as are explicitly granted by the Act.
In the United States the decisions of the various state courts in
reference to the right to recover damages for death occasioned by
another's negligence are not in accord, but generally a more liberal
view obtains than in England. Where statutes, similar to Lord
Campbell's Act, have not been adopted, the common law rule
prevails, and death affords no ground for an action of damages.
In those states where by statutory right an action may be maintained for damages resulting from death, funeral expenses are
recoverable when they have been incurred by those entitled to bring
such action: Penna. Co. v. Lily, 73 Ind. 252 (1881); Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone, 59 N. J. L. 275 (1896) ; Cleveland
R. R. Co. v. Rowan, 66 Pa. 393 (1870) ; Mlirphy v. Vew York,
Etc., R. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 445 (1882); Peie v. Columbia, Etc.,
R. R. Co. 39 S. Car. 303 (1888). In several states, however, the
English doctrine is followed, and burial expenses are disallowed on
the ground that only such damages are recoverable as result from
the loss of the decedent as a wage earner: Holland v. Brown, 13

